GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SVK Strategic Planning and Capabilities Development Division



CURRENT REFORM ASSUMPTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC in the context of security environment evolution and limited source provision

Maj Jaroslav GELETIČ

Coordination of International Military Cooperation Branch/J5

Interoperability Conference 2012

Agenda

1. Transformation Milestones

- Force/C2 Structure until 31 May 09
- Force/C2 Structure since 01 June 09
- 2. Threats
- 3. Tasks and Resources Imbalance
- 4. Options
 - Reform
 - Pooling and Sharing

5. Conclusions



1. Transformation Milestones



Long-Term Plans

- In 2001 developed "Model 2010"
- In 2005 developed "Model 2015"
- In 2009 developing "Model 2020" Not Finalised
- In 2011-2012 developing "SDR New Model"



Objectives of Transformation

To establish


- An effective, professional but affordable Armed Forces organized, equipped and trained to comply with the SVK Defence Strategy

- A modernized Armed Forces to be interoperable with NATO


The Main Areas of Transformation

- 1. Force/C2 structure
- 2. Personnel Management
- 3. Training Management
- 4. Armament Modernization





²⁸ March, 2012





2. Threats



NATO

- **New Strategic Concept (2010)**
- **Multiple Futures Project (2009)**



European Security Strategy (2003)


Report on the Implementation of the ESS - Providing Security in a Changing World (2008)

An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs (2006)











CYBER DEFENCE

WMD

FAILING STATES

PIRACY



2. Threats




National analysis

- Security Challenges for the Slovak Republic
- Slovak potential allows us respond to majority of Security Challenges only within International Community Framework
- Slovak Armed Forces must be ready to react immediately using own capabilities to natural disasters, technological catastrophes, NBC effects management, illegal massive migration, or public order restoration within the Slovak Republic Framework.

Range and Complexity of tasks in the area of state defence are increasing

building better, resources demanding capabilities.





3. Tasks and Resources Imbalance


Increase of Slovak Armed Forced Tasks since independence



	Transformation of Slovak Armed Forces	NATO/EU OPERATIONS	NRF & EU BG	NATIONAL ASPECTS
1994	Armed Forces Development Concept until 2000 (46 000 professionals)	0/0	×	Individual Defence
1999	Concept of MoD SR Reform until 2002 (37 700 professionals)	44/0	×	
2001	Model 2010 (24 500 professionals)	102/2	×	
2005	Model 2015 (18 700 professionals)	120/6	×	Collective Defence
2009		385/40	NRF 2006 (4) NRF 2007 (23) NRF 2008 (789) NRF 2009 (24) EU BG CZE 2/2009 (442)	
2010	Model 2020 proposal (16 000 professionals)	458/45	EU BG POL 1/2010 (346)	
2011	SDR White Book of Defence	352/48	NRF 2011 (6) NRF 2012 (153) - preparation	

28 March, 2012

10



SOLUTION CH SIL	3. Tasks and Resources Imbalance			
Critical Capabilities of Armed Forces versus Expenditures				
Example of prioritising of tasks and capabilities <u>% of GDP</u>				
Armed Forces of SR must be able to:				
l in full efined a	1. Contribute to international crisis management operations (up to 600 personnel)			
Completing in full scale of defined criteria	2. Defend Slovak airspace within NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS)			
Con sc	3. Participate in NRF (0,9% of IRF), alternatively in EU BG and maintain DCM			
Acting in crisis regime and in the scale enabled by available sources	4. Maintain Mechanised Battalion Group in - 1,20 NATO HRF			
	5. Provide air transport DCM and CMOs and tactical air transport for land force			
me anc ilable (6. Fulfil other existing commitments to NATO (CoE EOD)			
g in crisis regime and in the enabled by available sources	7. Achieve and maintain FOC of mechanised brigade keeping it in FLR as well as provide HNS for Allied Forces			
ng in c enabl	8. Provide air defence for the state critical infrastructure - 1,80			
Acti	9. Provide defence for additional important facilities - 2,00			
10. Manage other approved FGs				



3. Tasks and Resources Imbalance



Strategic options - What next?

- armed forces reached a crossroad
- three possible strategic options

<u>Strategic option No. 1</u>: Maintaining the current status = **Status Quo**.

Strategic option No. 2: Achieving balance between tasks and resources by **narrowing the Slovak political-military ambition.**

Strategic option No. 3: Achieving balance between tasks and resources via **increase of defence funding.**

Slovak Government has decided not to decrease politicalmilitary ambition of the state and noted the SDR material.

To prepare Slovak Armed Forces model based on 1,1% of GDP estimation





Basic principles of the Slovak Armed Forces Development

- 1) Level of Ambition
- 2) No change in committments to NATO and EU
- 3) Development of the Armed Forces to fulfil key priorities:
 - Defence of Slovak Airspace within (NATINADS)
 - Contribution to International Crisis Management Operations
 - Assistance to Management of Non-Military Crisis Situations
 - Provision of Mechanised Brigade to Collective Defence of Alliance
 - provide HNS for Allied Forces
- 4. Increase level of interoperability
- 5. Continue in Increasing of Effectiveness and Economy



4. Options - Reform

Proposed Measures



. To decrease expenses

- Rationalization of support structures in relation to defined needs of final Slovak Armed Forces Model
- Tactical units reorganization
- Infrastructure
- Armaments
- Mobilization System and Active Reserves

II. To increase interoperability

- Equipment modernisation
- Reorganisation of tactical units according to NATO Standards
- Training in accordance with NATO Standards





Equipment Modernisation

- Light Tactical MultiPurpose Vehicles
- 2 4 Medium Tactical Transport Airplanes
- Air Defence System
- Medium MultiPurpose Helicopters
- Logistic Units, CIS Elements, Medical, Small Arms
- Political Decision on MultiPurpose Tactical Jets

Outside MoD Budget



4. Options – Pooling and Sharing

Smart Defence



- Centres of Excellence as Hubs of E&T
- Pooling & Sharing Multinational Medical Treatment Facilities (ROLE 2)
- Pooling CBRN capabilities CZE-HUN-SVN Regional Grouping
- Distributed Training and Exercise (DTE)

EU (EDA, PSC, EUMC, EUMS) Regional Defence Cooperation Visegrad Group Bilateral Activities (Czech Republic)



4. Options – Pooling and Sharing



Possible Areas in Multinational Approaches

NATO/EU Level

- □ NATINADS
- C-IED
- Strategic and Tactical Air Transport
- Multinational Logistics and Medical Support
- Cyber Defence
- □ ACCS
- □ AGS
- □ JISR

Regional Level:

- Military Training Area Lešť,
- CBRN Training Centre Zemianske Kostoľany
- Armed Forces Academy
- Leading Role in CoE EOD Development
- □ Active Role in NATO DCM
- Best Potential within Regional (V4) Framework and bilaterally with Czech Republic



5. Conclusions



White Book of Slovakia's Defence, won't be dealt with any further in the current electoral term,

"It'll be up to the new government as to whether it agrees to the proposed strategy or not."

Thank you for your attention



Building the capabilities of Armed Forces to conduct irregular warfare




Štefan ACSAI MAJ, SVK A



Introduction

- 1. Operational environment
- 2. Irregular activities
- 3. Military contribution
- 4. COIN operations
- 5. Slovak AF approach to asymmetric conflict
- Summary
- Discussion

1.Operational environment Variable factors of the operational environment



AJP-3.4.4

1. Operational environment

Actors

- Host nation civil authorities
- International organizations
- Alliance and coalition governments
- Non-governmental organizations
- Commercial organizations
- Private security companies
- Media

2. Irregular activities

- Insurgency
- Terrorism
- Criminality
- Disorder
- Subversion


3. Military contribution

Military objectives


- Secure the population
- Isolate the insurgents from their support
- Contain the insurgents in a broader regional context
- Target the insurgents`organization
- Neutralize the insurgents` armed organizations

3. Military contribution

Operational approach



3.Military contribution Transition



4. COIN Operations

- Troops-to-task analysis
- Brigade combat teams
- Host nation security forces
- Capabilities

5. Slovak AF approach to asymmetric conflict

- Doctrines
- Participation in various activities
- Training and exercises





Summary

- Operational environment
- Irregular activities
- Military contribution
- COIN operations
- Slovak AF approach to asymetric conflict

Discussion





AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND SPORTS National Defence Academy

Military reforms in the light of the security environment changes and defence budget restrictions

Force development under the current Austrian budgetary restrictions

Liptovský Mikuláš, 29.3.2012

Lieutenant Colonel Mag. Mag. Thomas Fronek Head of Department of Military Command and Management Institut for Higher Military Command, Leadership and Management National Defence Academy of the Austrian Armed Forces



www.bmlvs.gv.at



National Defence Academy

Agenda

- General
- Political and strategic guidelines
- > Budgetary restrictions
- Conclusions
- > Way ahead AAF





AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND SPORTS

National Defence Academy





NATO/PfP

Neutrality

Compulsory military service in discussion




www.bmlvs.gv.at




AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND SPORTS

National Defence Academy






Political and strategic guidelines AAF



Planning Guideline 2011 – 2016 of the MOD



AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND SPORTS National Defence Academy



Planning Guideline 20XX – 20XX of the MOD



National Security Strategy 2011

The NSS is the central framework for Austria's security policy:

- Comprehensive National Defence
- Joint (holistic) National Defence
- Proactive National Defence
- Solidary National Defence
 - Austria will participate in the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy in all its dimensions
- Constitutional basis: neutrality


definition of the tasks for the AAF




www.bmlvs.gv.at



National ambitions and budgetary restrictions















20xx

SCHUTZ & HILFE



AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND SPORTS

National Defence Academy

National ambition for international operations (Planning Guideline 2011-2016)






BDE-Level Lead Nation in stability and reconstruction ops (S&R) for up to 1 year

1 BN S&R indefinitely in 1 AOR

1 BN Peace Keeping indefinitely in 1 AOR

1 BN on short notice for a 6 month-operation across the whole spectrum of military operations



National reserves





National Defence Academy

Budget reductions AAF 2007-2016


Budget 2007/2008	minus € 97 Million*
Budget 2009 – 2013	minus € 409 Million*
Budget 2011 – 2014	minus € 531 Million*
Budget 2012 – 2015	minus € 11 Million*
Budget 2012 – 2016	minus € 618 Million*
* Compared to the framework budget figures decided upon one year before	Total: minus € 1.666 Billion



AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND SPORTS

National Defence Academy

National ambitions and budgetary restrictions





Challenges for the AAF

Austrian security-political priorities have changed from reactive defence to proactive multinational stabilization as well as homeland security and support tasks. This functional priority placed on external and internal tasks requires an overstretched concentration of resources and therefore clear priorities due to the low level of defence expenditures.



Capabilities AAF





AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND SPORTS


National Defence Academy

Conclusions I

- > HOLD > OPERATIVE PAUSE
- Consolidation of current capabilities > loss of time to readjust



Force development capability development 2004 – 20XX





National Defence Academy

Conclusions I

- HOLD > OPERATIVE PAUSE
- Consolidation of current capabilities > loss of time to readjust
- Identification and implementation of savings in operational costs
 - Personell > downfall on capabilities






AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND SPORTS

National Defence Academy

Personell figures








National Defence Academy

Current force structure AAF 2012: ~55.000





www.bmlvs.gv.at



AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND SPORTS

National Defence Academy

Conclusions I

- HOLD > OPERATIVE PAUSE
- Consolidation of current capabilities > Loss of time to readjust
- Identification and implementation of savings in operational costs
 - Personell > downfall on capabilities
 - Disposal of substantial number of equipment > AAF 50% of the armoured vehicle fleet > downfall on capabilities
- Capability development in certain fields stopped > AAF to lead a multinational framework brigade across the whole spectrum of military operations stopped





National Defence Academy

Conclusions II

- Focus on the development of specialised high demand capabilities:
 - for example AAF:
 - Specialised infantry,
 - SOF,
 - Engineer,
 - Medical support (Role 1, Role 2),
 - Ground transportation,
 - Search & Rescue,
 - NBC defence and Rotary Wing Air Transport





AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND SPORTS

National Defence Academy

Conclusions III

- Estimation process on possible future areas of Pooling
 & Sharing and Regional Cooperation necessary
- New scenario and capability based planning process to transform armed forces based on new budget in conjunction with the NSS > What is the level of ambition?
- Changes in quality/quantity & timelines of force development of Armed forces > 5-10 years > too long?



New Planning Guideline 2013-20xx to be written





AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND SPORTS National Defence Academy

Way ahead AAF

- The Minister of Defence & Sports tasked the General Staff in November 2010 to work out different types of the Austrian Armed Forces with and without conscription. These armed forces are to be able to fulfil the same tasks as today's forces.
- > The Minister of Defence & Sports prefers the following type:

Current force	structure: ~55.0	00	New forces	structure: ~55.00	00
Career soldiers (~11.000) & Civilians (~8.500)		Career soldiers (~9.500) & Civilians (~7.000)			
2.950 Contracted soldiers	Recruits (~ 24.000 per year)	Reserve forces (~31.400)	5.500 Contracted soldiers	Voluntary reserve forces (~10.000)	Reserve forces for worst case scenarios (~23.000)



Way ahead AAF

5th September 2011: The Minister of Defence & Sports tasked the General Staff to establish 3 prototype projects to gain further experience for a possible change to an all volunteer force.

 \succ The aim is to:

- to make reserve units more attractive
- to reduce conscripts in administrative/supporting functions
- to create a prototype all volunteer unit





AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND SPORTS National Defence Academy

Military reforms in the light of the security environment changes and defence budget restrictions

Force Development

under the current Austrian budgetary restrictions

Thank you for your attention! I am looking forward to taking your questions!

Lieutenant Colonel Mag. Mag. Thomas Fronek Head of Department of Military Command and Management Institut for Higher Military Command, Leadership and Management National Defence Academy of the Austrian Armed Forces



www.bmlvs.gv.at



Military Capabilities in COIN operations on the tactical level

"Interoperability Conference 2012", 29th March 2012





Personal Background

- Maj (GS) Markus WACHTEL
- Dep J5/JFC
- Several papers during CGSC
 - Operational Aspects of COIN
 - Capabilities in COIN





Austrian situation concerning COIN

- AUT is currently not involved in COIN-ops
- PSO focused \rightarrow robust military operations
- Theoretical approach vs. Experience






Military Capabilities in COIN

- Very few military capabilities are exclusively relevant only in COIN-ops
- Technical aspects of capabilities are applicable to different scenarios
- COIN is foremost a thing of doctrine/mind set
 - Employ fitting capabilities in the current situation
 - Long term learning/development





Aim of military operations in COIN







AUT doctrine concerning COIN

- Types of insurgents
 - Fundamentalists (Religious motivation)
 - Separatists (Ethnical motivation)
 - Rebels (Political motivation)
- Accounted for in own field manuals
 - General despcription of COIN
 - Focused on military tasks (attack, defend,...)
 - MDMP suitable for all missions
 - Complex situations hard to simulate during training
- Definition of insurgency/COIN only in national context





Combat operations

- Protection
 - Air assets
 - C-IED project
- Command
 - C²I system PHÖNIX
 - International cooperation (higher tactical/operational level)
 - National training (lower tactical level)
- Inform
 - Air RECCE
- Engage
 - IVECO
 - Fire control system





Essential services (Life Support), Governance, Economic development

- Experience from missions in AUT and abroad
- Capabilities available
 - Water purification
 - General support engineers
 - Experts
- Challenge
 - Employ capabilities under new conditions (threat level)





Conclusions

- Capabilities in general available
 Especially for non combat aspects
- COIN not primary focus for forces development
- COIN aspects included in capability development
- Bismarck:

"I choose to learn from the experience of others."





FAKULTY OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT



MILITARY REFORMS

IN THE LIGHT OF THE SCURITY CHANGES AND DEFENCE BUDGETS RESTRICTIONS

COL (Ret.) Pavel ZUNA, Ph.D.

Interoperability Conference, Liptovský Mikuláš 2012





OUTLINE

- 1. Introduction
- 2. Security Environment Impression
- 3. Security Budgets





1. Introduction







1. Introduction







1. Security Environment Impression


Security Environment Assumptions

- Threats and sources; internal and external security of nation
- Defense and Security military & non-military tools
- Unconvetional threats prevailing
- Impact of Euro-Atlantic Outside Security





1. Security Environment Impression







1. Security Environment Impression

Security Environment Threats Sources

- Political Radicalism
- Terrorism tied with the nationalism
- Ideological or Religious Fundamentalism
- Proliferation of WMD
- Missuse of non-military Technologies
- Cybernetic assaults
- Regional Conflicts
- Organized Crime





1. Security Environment Impression


Security Environment Threats Conditions

- Economic Interconnectedness and Interdepndencies
- Population explosion & Failing States & Public Order
- Availability of Natural Resources
- Proliferation of WMD
- Non State Actors Strive for Power
- Budgetary, Economic and Finantial Crisis Social Impacts







1. Security Environment Impression Economic Risks







1. Security Environment Impression






F

FAKULTY OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT




1. Security Environment Impression








1. Security Environment Impression Societal Risks








1. Security Environment Impression Technological Risks










Future employment of the CZE AF's

- Security and Stability
- Prevention & Solution of Conflicts
- UN's Global Stabilisation Role
- OSCE's Prevention of Armed Conflicts
- Control of Conventional Armament in Europe
- Availability of Strategic Raw Material Resources
- NATO/EU Cooperation with Partner Nations
- Upholding of Democracy, Freedoms and Rule of Law
- Suppression of Political Extremism, mainly manifested as Terrorism



2. Security Budgets

Financial Framework Development during the Reform of the Czech Armed Forces, FY 2003–2013





The instability of the budgetary framework is the main problem for planning. The Concept of Building the Professional Czech Armed Forces from 2002 calculated with allocating 2% of GDP for the MoD Budget till 2010, but this has never happened. As early as 2003, this concept had to be readjusted to the changed resource framework. This framework has been diminishing further, despite the fact that in 2006 the Government pledged to strive for its augmentation.





2. Security Budgets Výdaje MV ČR










DISCUSSION

Is the Decline of the Security Budgets relevant to the Current Global Risks and the Role of the Security Tools to cope with them?

Are the Military Reforms relevant to the Expected Role of the Security Tools?





A model approach to the decision-making process

"Interoperability Conference2012" "Building the capabilities of armed forces to conduct irregular warfare"

Ivana MOKRÁ University of Defense Faculty of economics and management Department of military management and tactics

Content

- Decision (decision-making process)
- A history of decision-making process
- A tactical decision support
- A model approach
- Conclusion

 Military is one of those broad and important areas of social theory and practice, in which modelling & simulation in today's sense have been used for centuries.

Decision-making process

- One of the most important activities
- Can be understood as a core management
- Decision-making is always a choice between minimaly two options



Military factors:

- ≻ Time
- > Asset
- Unfamiliar environment
- Factor of possible loss of life
- Factor of possible loss of technology



A history of tactical modelling

- Relatively long-term development since antique
- Theoretically-technological wall
- Oldest combat game the chess
- Operational research
- Computer technology
- Simulator with virtual Reality
- DEEP BLUE



Game 6: 5/11/97:

Deep Blue wins

A tactical decision support » systems C4I and its Czech version

- Control software for modular combat systém of soldier of the 21^{st.} century.
- No longer new & developed or introduced in all the developed armies of the world.
- Attention focused on the lowest tactical

level



System performance:

Tactical overview of common situation Digital topographical support Digital voice communication Real time tactical video transmition Elementary decision support analyses



A model approach » The DEEP GREEN Concept

- This concept is an innovative approach to using simulation to support ongoing military operations while they are being conducted.
- The basic approach is to maintain a state space graph of possible future states.
- Develop technologies
 to help the commander:



A model approach » Model of decision-making precess

- Solution and construction of models is motivated by intentions to limit the intuitive decision-making
- Multi-criteria decision-making process
- Geo-tactical analyses
- Tactical, geographic, technical conditions

Conclusion

- Relatively long-term development since antique
- Theoretically-technological limitations
- Model access cannot be confused with using C4ISR/V21 systems or current simulators
- The approach is still in the beginning